Ce-si face Ursul cu … mana lui (pardon, scuzati), Iskander-K – Sursa: militaryrussia.ru
E aproape stabilit: instalatia Aegis Ashore de la Deveselu va primi mijloace de aparare anti-aeriana, impotriva avioanelor si rachetelor de croaziera. Va fi o capacitate aditionala, in fara celei de baza, anti-balistice, asigurata de interceptorii SM-3.
Decizia a fost provocata de mutarile gresite facute de Rusia, accelerate in ultimul timp. Primul pas a fost facut in 2007, cand Rusia a testat o racheta de croziera lansata de la sol cu o raza de actiune mai mare de cei 500 de km permisi de tratatul INF care urmareste interzicerea rachetelor nucleare (balistice sau de croaziera) cu raza intermediara (500km-5.500km) lansate terestru. Racheta de croaziera testata de rusi, cunoscuta drept R-500 a fost lansata de pe o platforma Iskander modificata, sistemul fiind cunoscut drept Iskander-K. A nu se confunda cu celelalte versiuni Iskander care sint rachete balistice cu raza scurta de actiune.
Incalcarea prevederilor INF este un fapt grav insa SUA a reactionat relativ tarziu, acuzand oficial Rusia abia in 2014. E posibil ca declaratiile repetate ale rusilor referitoare la desfasurarea Iskander in Vest, amenintand Polonia si balticii, sa fi contribuit la asta. Capacitatea tehnica de a face acelasi lucru si in Crimeea si, in plus, stabilirea clara a obiectivului fortelor ruse (lovirea elementelor Scutului ABM) ar fi doar un motiv in plus.
Miscarile rusilor nu aveau cum sa treaca neobservate si tot in 2014, ca o recomandare pe marginea discutiei referitoare la NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) 2015, comisia Camerei Reprezentantilor cerea intocmirea unui raport care sa analizeze vulnerabilitatea instalatiilor Aegis impotriva amenintarilor care ar incalca tratatul INF:
“The committee directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander, U.S. European Command, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, to provide a report to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not later than September 1, 2014, detailing the following:
…
(2) The capability of the Aegis Ashore systems scheduled to be deployed to Romania and the Republic of Poland to detect Russian military systems that are inconsistent with or in circumvention of the INF treaty, and the appropriate types of interceptor missiles, including interceptor missiles other than the Standard Missile-3, that would be capable of defending allies and U.S. deployed forces from such Russian military systems that could be deployed at such Aegis Ashore sites, as well as a detailed explanation of any hardware and software changes required to those sites in order to provide a cruise-missile defense capability, and the costs of those changes;” (Sursa: house.gov)
Concluziile raportului au fost folosite ca baza pentru deciziile cuprinse in NDAA aferent anului (fiscal) 2016, care urmeaza sa primeasca votul final in aceste zile si care prevede ca:
Continuare…