Un episod din serialul “Fiecare intelege cat poate“:
Merita vazut/auzit fie si numai pentru modul de abordare al subiectului.
Un altfel de discurs
April 29th, 2019 
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Posted in Uncategorized TehnoMil
Un blog despre tehnica militara
April 29th, 2019 admin Posted in Uncategorized
Interesant, dar…
Ce ignora in paralela pe care o face?
Ingerinta masiva a politicului in luarea deciziilor importante cu privire la modul de ducere a luptei, incepand cu razboiul din Coreea.
“After MacArthur had publicly and repeatedly differed with the president over military strategy in Korea, Truman replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway, who was given “qualified authority” to use the bombs(atomic) if he felt he had to.”
“According to cold war historian John Lewis Gaddis, who was interviewed about the Korean War for a 1999 PBS documentary “American Experience: Race for the Superbomb,” the role of the atomic bomb was undefined. “It’s one of the biggest dogs that did not bark in the entire cold war,” says Gaddis. “There was no clear strategy worked out ahead of time for what the role of nuclear weapons in the limited war would be. You’re talking about a war, particularly after the Chinese intervene, with peasants coming down mountain trails carrying everything on their backs. And this was simply not what the atomic bomb had been built for. The only way that you can make the atomic bomb credible is precisely by not using—by keeping it out there as a kind of mysterious, awesome force. That to use it would actually cheapen it somehow.”
O fi fost Kennedy un progresist, dar sa pui un “Whiz Kids” secretarul apararii pare cam mult.
“McNamara was also at the centre of a drive to alter U.S. military strategy from the “massive retaliation” of the Eisenhower years to a “flexible response” emphasizing counterinsurgency techniques.
On visits to South Vietnam in 1962, 1964, and 1966, the secretary publicly expressed optimism that the National Liberation Front and its North Vietnamese allies would soon abandon their attempt to overthrow the U.S.-backed Saigon regime.
As early as 1965, however, McNamara had privately begun to question the wisdom of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, and by 1967 he was openly seeking a way to launch peace negotiations. He initiated a top-secret full-scale investigation of the American commitment to Vietnam (later published as The Pentagon Papers), came out in opposition to continued bombing of North Vietnam (for which he lost influence in the Johnson administration), and in February 1968 left the Pentagon to become president of the World Bank.”
Nu mira pe nimeni ca “Operations Linebacker 1 & 2” au fost mai eficiente in a cuminti NVA, decat un deceniu de razboi?
Invazia Irakiana a fost un succes deplin, doar ca pe urma “HALLIBURTON & CO” au asteptat ca armata SUA, dupa ce au castigat razboiul, sa le castige si pacea. Asta era sarcina celor care cer voturi(Capitoliu si White House).
Ca o consideratie personala, felul in care “nu intelege” intrebarea lui Ronald Winter si pasarea unei parti a raspunderii pe Public Affairs Office, jigneste inteligenta asistentei.
“To brief his comander on who you’re dealing with…primul lucru care i se reaminteste unui militar inainte de o dislocare in TO, Centre de Pregatire Multinationale, etc. este ca nu poate purta conversatii care sa implice Tara, Administratia, Institutia din care face parte, peste nivelul lui de “competenta” profesionala. Nu se poate formula mai simplu.
Faptul ca desi militar,”poate”, Petraeus nu era la nivelul lui McChrystal, avand in schimb abilitati superioare de a interactiona cu “terti”, este contrazis de modul in care si-a incheiat “cariera” in Administratia Americana.
Daca asta se intampla in Afganistan sau Irak
https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/task-force-baum-300-men-to-rescue-his-son-in-law-from-a-nazi-prison
…care era reactia?
Per total insa, are un pct de vedere corect.
Pt incheiere as merge la min. 17, WELL DONE.
Am ezitat, initial, sa includ “Project 100,000” in textul de mai sus.
E un “subiect” inca greu de gestionat fara prejudecati.
Dar fiecare isi trage concluziile.
Forrest Gump nu reuseste sa atenueze imaginea neplacuta creata de “McNamara’s 100,000”.
Comparisons between Project 100,000 participants and their nonveteran peers showed that, in terms of employment status, educational achievement, and income, nonveterans appeared better off. Veterans were more likely to be unemployed and to have a significantly lower level of education. Income differences ranged from $5,000 [to] $7,000, in favor of nonveterans. Veterans were more likely to have been divorced.
…si asta e partea plina a paharului.
Jumatatea goala e asta:
“the program offered a one-way ticket to Vietnam, where these men fought and died in disproportionate numbers”
“they died at higher rates than other Americans serving in Vietnam”
Cel putin militarii nu au facut rabat total la presiunea “civila”.
“Entrance requirements were loosened, but all the Project 100,000 men were sent through normal training programs with other recruits, and performance standards thus were the same for everyone.”
Civili vs militari…